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A B S T R A C T
Ensuring public access to the information that State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) produce is necessary and
corporate websites should be used for this purpose. However, there is a lack of research analyzing the ac-
countability of SOEs. This paper aims to identify different accountability patterns among SOEs by carrying
out an assessment of the e-disclosure levels of Spanish SOEs. For this purpose, a comprehensive website
content analysis of 91 SOEs owned by the Spanish central government was carried out. Each website was
analyzed for 60 items classified into 4 dimensions: 1) financial information, 2) information about object-
ives and strategies, 3) corporate governance and 4) usability. In order to identify different accountability
patterns among SOEs, cluster, multidimensional scaling and Pro-Fit analyses were carried out. Results
show that e-disclosure practices among Spanish SOEs are still in their infancy. Financial accountability
is the main focus of SOEs disclosures and most are silent about their policies, objectives and corporate
governance structures. The majority of them are still anchored in a narrow accountability style that only
considers shareholders as the key stakeholders and they are a long way from fulfilling the OECD recommend-
ation that they should be as transparent as listed companies. Furthermore, results show that enforcement
of transparency-related legislation is scarce in Spain. Based on these findings, some recommendations to
improve e-disclosure practices among SOEs are suggested.
©2019 ASEPUC. Published by EDITUM - Universidad de Murcia. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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R E S U M E N
Garantizar el acceso del público a la información que generan las Empresas Públicas (EP) es necesario y las
páginas web corporativas deberían utilizarse para lograr este objetivo. Sin embargo, no existen estudios
académicos que analicen la rendición de cuentas por parte de las EP. Este trabajo pretende identificar
diferentes estilos de rendición de cuentas en las EP, llevando a cabo una evaluación de los niveles de
divulgación a través de Internet de las EP españolas. Para lograr este objetivo, se ha llevado a cabo un
análisis de 91 EP de titularidad estatal. En cada página web se ha analizado la presencia de 60 atributos
clasificados en 4 dimensiones: 1) información financiera, 2) información sobre objetivos y estrategias, 3)
gobierno corporativo y 4) facilidad de uso. Para identificar los diferentes estilos de rendición de cuentas
se han utilizado análisis cluster, escalas multidimensionales y Pro-Fit. Los resultados muestran que las
prácticas de divulgación de información a través de Internet de las EP españolas todavía se encuentran
muy poco desarrolladas. La rendición de cuentas de tipo financiero ocupa el principal foco de atención
de las EP y en su mayoría no divulgan información sobre sus políticas, objetivos y estructuras de gobierno
corporativo. La mayor parte están ancladas en un estilo limitado de rendición de cuentas que solo
considera a los accionistas como principales agentes interesados y lejos de cumplir la recomendación de
la OCDE de ser tan transparentes como las empresas cotizadas. Además, los resultados muestran que el
cumplimiento de la legislación en materia de transparencia es escaso. Sobre la base de estos resultados, se
sugieren algunas recomendaciones para mejorar las prácticas de divulgación de información a través de
Internet en las EP.
©2019 ASEPUC. Publicado por EDITUM - Universidad de Murcia. Este es un artículo Open Access bajo la
licencia CC BY-NC-ND (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
https://doi.org/10.6018/rcsar.382231
©2019 ASEPUC. Published by EDITUM - Universidad de Murcia. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
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Introduction
Despite the trend toward privatization in recent decades,
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)1 are still significant eco-
nomic players (European Commission, 2016; Grossi, Papen-
fuSS, & Tremblay, 2015; World Bank, 2014). They account
for around 10% of the global gross domestic product (Bruton,
Peng, Ahlstrom, Stan, & Xu, 2015). According to Florio, Fer-
raris, and Vandome (2018), the world’s 2,000 largest SOEs
employ more than 6 million people, their operating reven-
ues make up 19% of international trade and their total sales
represent 6% of the world’s gross national income. Although
their importance is lower than in the past in a number of
countries which have undertaken significant privatization
programs since the 80s, such as Spain, SOEs are still relev-
ant in these countries. They are prevalent in public services
of general economic and social interest (see OECD, 2005a,
2017), whose performance is of great importance to broad
segments of the population. Furthermore, substantial pub-
lic expenditure is usually allocated to these organizations
(Alexius & Cisneros, 2015). As good governance of SOEs
is critical to ensure their positive contribution to economic
efficiency and competitiveness (Grossi et al., 2015; OECD,
2015b; Rygh, 2018), requirements and pressure for effect-
iveness, efficiency, sustainability and transparency in SOEs
are increasing (Grossi et al., 2015; World Bank, 2014).
SOEs manage public money and pursue social goals that
coexist with economic objectives (Allini, Manes Rossi, & Hus-
sainey, 2016). They are frequently referred to as hybrid or-
ganizations because they operate in a business-like manner
to provide public services with public funding and are polit-
ically governed (Grossi et al., 2015). This duality of public
and private elements raises important questions, such as to
what extent they use public or private accountability styles.
It has been argued that hybridity produces new or, at least,
different accountability regimes. SOEs have to address mul-
tiple information needs that may create difficulties because
they must achieve the objectives of private sector corporate
governance, focused on the relationship between a for-profit
organization and its shareholders, as well as public sector
accountability, particularly downward accountability to cit-
izens as taxpayers demanding adequate delivery of value for
money (Greiling, Traxler, & Stötzer, 2015; Shaoul, Stafford,
& Stapleton, 2012; Swiatczak, Morner, & Finkbeiner, 2015).
In fact, SOEs are expected to provide evenmore non-financial
information (e.g. achievement of objectives) and corporate
responsibility disclosures (e.g. social and environmental in-
formation) than private firms because of the need for the
legitimation of their existence and actions (Greiling et al.,
2015; OECD, 2016; van der Laan Smith, Adhikari, & Tondkar,
2005). As a result, transparency and disclosure are more
important for SOEs than for other companies; they have to
show that political control is being exercised at arm’s length
and make their goals clear to citizens (OECD, 2005a). The
organization Transparency International has highlighted ac-
countability through transparency and disclosure as one of
the ten principles to fight against corruption in SOEs (Wilkin-
son, 2017).
Transparency and e-disclosure are key elements to facilit-
ate the monitoring of whether SOEs are fulfilling their ob-
1For the purposes of this paper, SOEs are defined as any corporate en-
tity recognized by national law as an enterprise (e.g., joint stock companies,
limited liability companies or partnerships limited by shares) and in which
the central level of government exercises ownership and control (direct or
indirect participation or voting rights higher than 50%). The definition of
SOEs often includes corporations owned by local and regional levels of gov-
ernment, but our focus is central government ownership.
jectives and crucial to holding SOEs accountable for their
performance. Exposing processes and performance to pub-
lic scrutiny provides strong incentives for good manage-
ment (Cameron, 2004; Cucciniello, Porumbescu, & Grimme-
likhuijsen, 2017; Hood & Heald, 2006; IIRC, 2016; OECD,
2005a; Spá, Voda, & Zagrapan, 2018). An effective reporting
regime requires SOEs to abide by the same reporting, con-
trol, and audit frameworks as other significant corporate or
public interest entities and to disclose both financial and non-
financial information (Alexius & Cisneros, 2015; IIRC, 2016;
Ntim, Soobaroyen, & Broad, 2017; OECD, 2005b 2015b;
Wilkinson, 2017; World Bank, 2014). Ensuring public ac-
cess to the information that SOEs produce is necessary and
corporate websites should be used for this purpose. How-
ever, there is a lack of research analyzing the accountability
of SOEs (Daiser, Ysa, & Schmitt, 2017; Grossi et al., 2015).
In this context, the objective of this paper is to identify dif-
ferent accountability patterns among SOEs by carrying out an
assessment of the e-disclosure levels of Spanish SOEs. Span-
ish SOEs have been chosen because of the strong impact of
the economic crisis in Spain and because of the corruption
scandals that have increased citizen demand for public fin-
ancial accountability (see ICAEW, 2014). Furthermore, the
Transparency Act (Government of Spain, 2013) has required
SOEs to disclose institutional and financial information on
the Internet since the end of 2014. According to Bonsón
and Flores-Muñoz (2014), an entity is more likely to dis-
close information if there is an obligation (to comply with
regulation), a financial necessity (to reduce its cost of cap-
ital) and/or social pressure (from stakeholders). A priori, all
these factors come together in the Spanish public sector today.
The results of this study are particularly useful to policy-
makers and standard-setters concerned with public sector
governance and the enforcement of corporate governance
codes as regards transparency and disclosure. Results sug-
gest that more efforts are needed to guarantee citizen access
to SOEs’ information and the enforcement of transparency-
related codes and legislation.
Downward accountability in SOEs: transparency, inter-
activity and stakeholder orientation
In SOEs, ownership is exercised by government officials
on behalf of the general public. Governance issues in SOEs
(Bruton et al., 2015; Grossi et al., 2015; OECD, 2015b; World
Bank, 2014) include complicated and, at times, contradictory
mandates, the absence of clearly identifiable owners, pass-
ive or distant oversight by the state as owner, politicized
boards and management, lack of autonomy in day-to-day
operational decision making, weak financial reporting and
disclosure practices, and insufficient performance monitor-
ing and accountability systems. Where these shortcomings
are more common, SOEs may also be a source of corrup-
tion. As an answer to these common problems, the OECD
(2005b) issued its Guidelines on Corporate Governance of
SOEs (updated in 2015), recommending that SOEs should
observe high standards of transparency, disclosing both finan-
cial and non-financial information, and that, in the interest
of the general public, they should be as transparent as listed
companies, if not more so, in order to fulfill both upward and
downward accountability.
Accountability is considered a necessary condition for pre-
serving democracy and facilitating good governance as well
as a mechanism to improve SOEs management. Account-
ability can have many different meanings or dimensions in
the public sector (Luke, 2010). The distinction between the
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traditional “upward accountability” and “public accountabil-
ity” or “downward accountability” (Heald, 2006; Luke, 2010)
is very important because the former does not imply that
the accountability process will be visible to outside parties
and tends to involve pre-determined actors/parties, poten-
tially excluding larger constituencies (see Ntim et al., 2017).
Within the public sector, accountability to Parliament has tra-
ditionally been the only focus, especially in Continental and
Southern Europe. Legislation and regulatory frameworks
governing SOEs commonly provide clear details of account-
ability in a traditional (upward) context (Luke, 2010).
Downward accountability is often defined as the answerab-
ility of government to the public on its performance (Behn,
2001; Bovens, Schillemans, & Hart, 2008; Wong & Welch,
2004). The extent to which an organization provides com-
prehensive information about its attributes (transparency)
and maintains timely communications with its various pub-
lics (interactivity) has been considered a measure of govern-
ment accountability (Pina, Torres, & Royo, 2010; Wong &
Welch, 2004). It is a sine qua non of modern democracies
that the public can and should scrutinize public expenditure
as part of the accountability process (Shaoul et al., 2012).
Therefore, downward accountability should be exercised in
an open forum and organizations/managers should be ex-
pected to make all information available for public scrutiny.
However, public sector reporting has been criticized because
accountability mechanisms have tended to focus on upward
accountability to funders rather than on downward account-
ability to citizens (Collier, 2008). This has started to change
in recent decades because of a greater focus on the consider-
ation of ethics in public management, the widespread adop-
tion of freedom of information acts and the use of ICTs.
In recent decades, accountability mechanisms have been
blossoming in the context of a severe crisis of legitimacy for
democracies (Célérier & Cuenca-Botey, 2015). Public expect-
ations as regards transparency and accountability have in-
creased considerably because of advances in ICTs. As ac-
countability depends upon the free flow of appropriate in-
formation (Cameron, 2004; Mulgan, 2000), the diffusion of
information through the corporate websites becomes crucial
for accountability to be a reality. Accountability using new
technologies helps citizens to perceive governments as access-
ible, transparent, responsible, effective and participative (Tol-
bert & Mossberger, 2006). However, downward accountabil-
ity seems to be a pending issue. Smith, Mathur, and Skelcher
(2006) argue that there is certainly strong upward accountab-
ility for spending and nationally set targets, but what is miss-
ing is public oversight – the ability of the community to hold
hybrid organizations to account for their actions. As shown
by Smith et al., (2006) and Shaoul et al., (2012), there may
be a democratic deficit exhibited by hybrid organizations in
relation to accountability to citizens.
This paper focuses on transparency and the e-disclosures
that are needed for SOEs to render accountability to citizens
(downward transparency2). As other authors do (Heald,
2006; Luke, 2010; Mulgan, 2000; Shaoul et al., 2012), we
recognize that accountability may have wide-ranging mean-
ings and that it may be achieved in many different ways. We
focus on the disclosure of financial, non-financial and corpor-
ate governance information. Furthermore, the literature has
acknowledged that the mere disclosure of information is not
2By downward transparency, Heald (2006, p. 27) refers to the possibility
of those “ruled” to observe the conduct, behavior and/or results of their
rulers. In the SOE context, downward transparency refers to the possibility
of any interested party to have access to comprehensive information about
the SOE, subject to the requirements of commercial confidentiality, security,
data and privacy laws (Wilkinson, 2017).
enough and that stakeholder orientation (or responsiveness)
is necessary for effective accountability (Cohen, Mamakou,
& Karatzimas, 2017; Cucciniello, Bellè, Nasi, & Valotti, 2015;
Shaoul et al., 2012). Therefore, the accessibility to and us-
ability of the information, together with the possibility of cit-
izens contacting SOEs to ask for transparency-related inform-
ation, have also been considered in this research. In the next
section, we propose a theoretical framework to explain the
different types of e-disclosures that SOEs can carry out and
that also includes the above mentioned features (accessibility,
usability and citizen dialogue) that promote public account-
ability.
Theoretical framework
The ideas of transparency and accountability are most of-
ten rendered normatively in terms of principals and agents
(agency theory). However, the ability of any single theor-
etical framework to explain e-disclosure practices is limited,
justifying the use of a multi-theoretical framework (Ntim et
al., 2017). A gradual incorporation of a wider set of so-
cial, political and institutional-led motivations in the volun-
tary and e-disclosure literature has taken place recently in
order to complement or supersede the mainstream agency
theory perspective by including insights from legitimacy, re-
source dependence, institutional and/or stakeholder theor-
ies, among others (Bonsón & Bednárová, 2015; Brennan &
Solomon, 2008; Cormier, Magnan, & Van Velthoven, 2005;
Gallego-Álvarez & Quina-Custodio, 2016; Greiling et al.,
2015; Ntim et al., 2017; Pina et al., 2010). A common
thread from these perspectives is that disclosure serves a
broader and more complex purpose in the organization’s in-
teractions with its environment than the narrow, wealth max-
imizing and rational actor logic that underpins agency the-
ory (Cormier et al., 2005; Ntim et al., 2017). This has been
made evident by the adoption of social missions by private
and public sector entities in the wake of the corporate social
responsibility (CSR) and sustainability movements (Alexius
& Cisneros, 2015; Bonsón & Bednárová, 2015; Greiling et
al., 2015). It is even clearer when considering hybrid organ-
izations where accountability for “performance” is inherently
multi-faceted (i.e. towards beneficiaries, government and/or
other shareholders, the public, staff, suppliers. . . ) and not
primarily driven, or measured, by financial distributions to
providers of capital.
As some of the theories listed above show a certain de-
gree of overlap, this study focuses on legitimacy and stake-
holder theories to complement agency theory in order to ex-
plain the type of information being disclosed through SOEs’
corporate websites. The basic difference between legitim-
acy and stakeholder theory resides in the breadth of the
plural concept of stakeholders. Whereas legitimacy theory
assumes that information must be addressed to society at
large, stakeholder theory accepts the existence of different in-
terest groups with different ideas as to how the firm can best
act, and with different capabilities for influencing organiza-
tional activity (Deegan, 2002, p. 294). As shown in Figure
1, our framework recognizes that SOEs may take a narrow
approach to accountability, by focusing on financial informa-
tion as themain interest of shareholders (agency theory point
of view) or a broader approach that considers the interest of
multiple stakeholders (legitimacy/stakeholder theories), by
adding non-financial information and other elements to fa-
cilitate public accountability.
Agency theory has traditionally been used for justifying
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Figure 1
Theoretical framework for e-disclosure in SOEs
Figure 1: Theoretical framework for e-disclosure in SOEs. 
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accountability practices and requirements. A central insight
of this theory is that those who rule may not have identical
interests to those that it is their responsibility to serve (moral
hazard), and that they must account for their actions to
demonstrate they have acted in line with their responsibil-
ities. Accountability for SOEs involves a complex chain of
agents (management, board, ownership entities, ministries,
the government and the legislature), in which the principals
are not easily identifiable or are remote. Therefore, this can
potentially be a fertile ground for insiders to motivate de-
cisions based on criteria other than the best interests of the
enterprise and the general public. The ability of the principal
to curb opportunistic behavior depends on howmuch inform-
ation it has about the performance of the agent. Therefore,
agency theory points to greater disclosure as the way to mitig-
ate information asymmetry and to reduce moral hazard and
agency costs. Greater disclosure also enables the principal to
exercise ex-post assessment of the dual role (agent/principal)
played by the state shareholder (Allini et al., 2016). There-
fore, agency theory explains the increasing presence of le-
gislation requiring greater information disclosures because
organizations do not usually report on a voluntary basis.
The disclosure of accounting information has always been
closely linked to the agency problem, since accounting has
the primary function of producing information for external
users who have no access to internal information. Agency
theory envisages disclosure as useful to assist users in making
assessments and decisions regarding financial issues, e.g. in-
vesting or divesting, monitoring managerial performance
and actions, ensuring contractual commitments are met, and
assessing risk (Ntim et al., 2017). In particular, agency theory
posits that disclosure is a means to reduce information asym-
metry between contractually related partners. Under this
perspective, shareholders are considered as the dominant
stakeholder group and protecting and enhancing shareholder
wealth is a major concern (Brennan & Solomon, 2008). As
such, downward accountability to citizens may not be con-
sidered as important as upward accountability in the SOEs
context. Furthermore, Shaoul et al., (2012) raise the ques-
tion of whether a system based on market mechanisms is
sufficient to ensure accountability in hybrid organizations
which are subject to public sector values (Grossi & Thomas-
son, 2015). Thus, the governance issues faced by SOEs are
slightly different to those of private firms, and their account-
ability should reflect the needs of multiple principal stake-
holders.
Legitimacy theory conceives the organization as a social
contract which links societal interests with business interests.
The basic concept of this theory is that organizations aim to
match their value systems with the values of the larger so-
cial system to which the entity belongs (Greiling et al., 2015;
Ntim et al., 2017). According to Suchman (1995, p. 574),
“legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, be-
liefs, and definitions”. Therefore, legitimacy theory provides
a societal-led motivation for voluntary disclosure. In general,
larger public sector organizations face greater legitimation
needs caused by their higher visibility and influence (Greil-
ing et al., 2015). Organizations, such as SOEs, can only sur-
vive if their activities and objectives are supported by soci-
ety and, as such, perceived to be legitimate. Voluntary dis-
closures are a building block of this theory (Deegan, 2002;
Suchman, 1995); they are desirable by themselves, in that
they are appropriate actions deemed to be “expected” of a
“professional and well-structured” organization. Within such
a perspective, voluntary disclosures might well be ritualistic
and symbolic in nature, with the aim of improving the firm’s
image (e.g, if the legitimacy of the organization is threatened
as a result of a particular event, the organization will adopt
different strategies to restore its legitimacy). Previous stud-
ies have shown that the search for legitimacy usually leads to
the disclosure of information that requires the lowest efforts
rather than promoting substantial changes in government-to-
citizen relationships (Pina et al., 2010; Pina, Torres, & Yetano,
2009).
Suchman (1995, p. 589 and 600) breaks down legitimacy
into three broad types: pragmatic (conforming to demands),
moral (conforming to ideals or adoption of best practices)
and cognitive (conforming to established/professional mod-
els or standards, as a way to demonstrate that the organiza-
tion has characteristics that are intrinsically worthy). As ex-
plained in the methodology section, this typology has been
adapted to classify the different types of disclosures made by
SOEs. This distinction between mandatory (pragmatic) and
discretionary (moral and cognitive) disclosures should be
useful to preserve a level of uniformity whilst simultaneously
allowing organizations to adapt e-disclosure to their specific
circumstances (Chiwamit, Modell, & Scapens, 2017). Cog-
nitive legitimacy becomes most significant in the absence of
clear outcome measures. According to Oliver (2004, p. 37),
“transparency in an organization is not only about what’s
communicated externally, but about what’s right on the in-
side, in the guts of its operations”. As suggested by Meyer
and Rowan (1977), structures and procedures often serve as
easily monitored proxies for less visible targets of evaluation,
such as outcomes.
Stakeholder theory
Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) is concerned with the
relationships of an organization with a variety of relevant
groups of stakeholders in society, rather than society at large.
A stakeholder is “a person or group that can affect or is af-
fected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives”
(Freeman, 1984 p. 46). Therefore, stakeholder theory places
a great deal of emphasis on the identification and manage-
ment of key interest groups. The stakeholder concept is inten-
ded to “broadenmanagement’s vision of its roles and respons-
ibilities beyond the profit maximization functions to include
interests and claims of non-stockholding groups” (Mitchell,
Agle, & Wood, 1997 p. 855). Shareholders are, of course,
a substantial class among stakeholders, but other audiences,
such as customers, suppliers, employees, local communities,
regulators, the media or the general public, may also be im-
portant. From a normative point of view, stakeholder theory
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sets out that organizations have to recognize the multiple ex-
pectations of their different stakeholders and that it is their
duty to provide a full and transparent account of their activ-
ities to a wider audience. In this line, stakeholder theory
highlights that corporate accountability should move beyond
simple economic or financial performance (Mitchell et al.,
1997) because the long-term survival and success of the cor-
poration requires the support of all its stakeholders and gain-
ing this support and approval requires a dialogue between
the management of a corporation and its stakeholders (van
der Laan Smith et al., 2005, p. 127). Previous research has
noted that code law countries have a higher stakeholder ori-
entation whereas shareholder orientation seems to be more
important in common law countries (Ball, Kothari, & Robin,
2000), which could potentially influence non-financial cor-
porate disclosures (see van der Laan Smith et al., 2005).
In comparison with private sector entities, public sector or-
ganizations are accountable to a larger variety of stakehold-
ers with less clear prioritization mechanisms and hierarchies
(Greiling et al., 2015). As regards the role of the general pub-
lic within this theoretical framework, the literature investig-
ating the normative aspects of this theory views citizens as
equal to the rest of the key stakeholders, with legitimate in-
terests driven by philosophical concepts such as moral ethics,
the common good, freedom, fairness and justice (Yekini, Ad-
elopo, Andrikopoulos, & Yekini, 2015, p. 253). However, the
literature acknowledges that, very often, variability in the dis-
closure themes may be due to an instrumental form of stake-
holder theory, whereby organizationsmay strategically orient
their voluntary disclosures to target and manage their most
important stakeholder(s) (Ntim et al., 2017; Pérez, López, &
García-De los Salmones, 2017).
Mitchell et al. (1997) argue that managers’ behavior to-
wards stakeholders’ demands will not only vary according
to the legitimacy of the different stakeholders, but also ac-
cording to their urgency and power. When there is legitim-
acy but not power and urgency, there is no pressure on man-
agers to engage in an active relationship with such stakehold-
ers, although managers can choose to do so. This may ex-
plain that, normally, financial and non-financial disclosures
are not widely adopted until mandatory requirements are
established. The international recognition of transparency
and disclosure as tools to improve trust and legitimacy in
SOEs (OECD, 2005b 2015b; Wilkinson, 2017; World Bank,
2014) and the recent enactment of legislation requiring pub-
lic sector transparency could be interpreted by SOEs’ man-
agers as urgency. As we move to a situation of dependency
(where there is urgency and the stakeholders are legitimate,
but have no power) citizens will depend upon others (other
stakeholders or the managers) for the power necessary to
satisfy their needs (see Mitchell et al., 1997). As has been
argued, public sector relationships between the agents (man-
agers) and principals (citizens) are complex, open-ended, not
explicitly defined and, thus, not easily monitored (Broadbent
& Laughlin, 2003; Letza, Smallman, & Sun, 2004). Thus,
citizens become legitimate stakeholders with the urgency of
the public sector reform, although they depend on the power
of other stakeholders to make SOEs’ transparency a pursued
goal. Therefore, according to stakeholder theory, the level
of disclosure, in particular for voluntary information, will re-
flect to what extent SOEs feel under pressure to legitimate
their actions through greater levels of disclosure.
Spanish context
In Spain, as in other Southern European countries such as
Italy (see Allini et al., 2016), SOEs were mainly created as
a result of either market failure, socio-political factors or a
combination of both. Nowadays, the size of the public enter-
prise sector at central level in Spain has decreased (European
Commission, 2016, p. 8 and 12) due to the privatization pro-
cess that started in the early 80s (Bachiller, 2009) and to a
second wave of reforms that has affected agencies, founda-
tions, SOEs and other governmental entities since the finan-
cial crisis. Even so, Spanish SOEs owned by the central gov-
ernment have a turnover of 25,000million euros (2.3% of the
Spanish GDP), manage assets worth 227,000 million euros
(22% of Spanish GDP) and employ 140,000 people Transpar-
ency International Spain, 2018.
The privatization of Spanish SOEs that started in the 80s
occurred for three basic reasons (Cabeza & Gómez, 2007):
1) the economic crisis of the late 70s and early 80s; 2) the
need to adjust Spanish industry to the new economic en-
vironment being ushered in by Spain joining the European
Community in 1986; and 3) the reaction to the opening-up
of international markets. As a result, 134 SOEs from almost
every industry (including strategic industries such as telecom-
munications, energy, transport and banking) were privatized
between 1985 and 2004 as part of a process of economic
restructuring founded upon liberalization and deregulation
(Cabeza & Gómez, 2007). However, the main arguments for
privatizations in Spain were not based on the assumed su-
perior efficiency of private ownership, but on the reduction
of deficit and public debt and the development of capital mar-
kets (Bachiller, 2009).
Since the last financial crisis, reforms in the SOEs sector
and the reduction in the number of SOEs have continued at
central level, reaching a certain level of stability since 2010.
In addition to the reduction in the number of SOEs, there
were other reforms oriented to improving their effectiveness
and transparency. These reforms included limits to the num-
ber of board members and to the salaries of SOEs’ managers
and members of the governing board. In addition, the Trans-
parency Act (Government of Spain, 2013) has required pub-
lic sector entities in general to disclose certain information
on the Internet since the end of 2014, as explained below.
Channels for the dissemination of information can be as
important as the content of the information itself (OECD,
2015a). The availability of certain information related to
Spanish SOEs has been greatly enhanced in recent years.
For example, SOEs’ financial statements and audit reports
have been available online since 2004 when the “Public sec-
tor annual accounts Registry” was created (nowadays this in-
formation can be accessed through the Transparency Portal,
http://transparencia.gob.es). Public procurement informa-
tion has also been available online since 2008 (nowadays,
all the information related to the central government and
some regional governments can be accessed through ht-
tps://contrataciondelestado.es). However, citizens do not
necessarily know these centralized resources and access to
other institutional and governance information is not central-
ized. Therefore, only individual corporate websites of SOEs
have been analyzed in this research. When they included dir-
ect links to specific sections in other websites containing the
individual information of the SOE under examination, this
information has also been considered (that is, when the cit-
izen was transferred seamlessly to information published in
other websites).
The Transparency Act (Government of Spain, 2013, art. 6-
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8) requires public sector institutions (including SOEs) to dis-
close institutional, organizational, planning and economic in-
formation through their websites3, including: functions, ap-
plicable regulations, organizational structure, multi-annual
plans and programs, goals and their achievement, financial
and budgetary information, audit reports, information re-
lated to public procurement and senior managers’ retribu-
tions, and the necessary statistical information in order to
assess to what extent service delivery and quality objectives
have been fulfilled. Furthermore, the act states that the in-
formation must be published in a clear, structured, under-
standable and reusable way, but no specific guidelines regard-
ing these aspects are provided.
Methodology
Sample and data collection
The sample of SOEs was taken from the Inventory of Pub-
lic Sector Organizations4 that is elaborated on a yearly basis
by the Spanish General State Comptroller (IGAE). Data refer-
ring to 31 December 2016 resulted in 146 enterprises owned
by the Spanish central government. After removing foreign
companies, those in liquidation or belonging to the financial
sector, the final sample comprises 94 enterprises. No website
was found for two of the companies and the website of an-
other company was not available due to the dockers’ strike
in the first months of 2017. Therefore, 91 SOEs are included
in this study. The Appendix provides aggregated background
information about the SOEs analyzed. The sector of activity
that includes the greatest number of companies is “transport-
ation and storage” (22%) and most of them are assigned to
the Ministry of Finance (57.1%). 10 (11%) are parent com-
panies required to prepare both individual and consolidated
financial statements, 49 (53.8%) prepare individual annual
accounts using the standard format and 32 (35.2%) use the
abbreviated format. Most of them (81 companies, 89%) have
a board of directors (BoD). One company, AENA, is listed on
the Spanish stock market and subject to additional disclos-
ure regulation under the supervision of the Spanish Stock
Exchange Commission (CNMV). This regulation, in terms of
content disclosure, is similar to the regulation of other de-
veloped markets, such as the United Kingdom.
A comprehensive website content analysis was carried out,
between mid-February and mid-March 2017, and each web-
site was analyzed for 60 items (see Table 1). These items
were selected based on the Transparency Act requirements
explained above, previous studies on internet financial re-
porting both in the public and the private sector (Caba,
Rodriguez, & López, 2008; Gandia & Archidona, 2008; Pina
et al., 2010) and the Guidelines on Corporate Governance
of SOEs (OECD, 2015b). To ensure the quality of the data
collected, the following actions were carried out. First, be-
fore the data collection, the authors separately analyzed 5
of the websites to check for consistency in the application of
the coding criteria5. Virtually no scoring differences were
found, although some additional clarifications were intro-
duced. All the codingwas undertaken by one personwith pre-
vious knowledge about financial reporting by Spanish SOEs
3Art. 6 also requires public administrations involved in the rulemaking
process to disclose information of legal relevance, but this does not apply to
SOEs.
4http://www.igae.pap.hacienda.gob.es/sitios/igae/es-ES/BasesDatos/
ClnInvespe/Paginas/invespe.aspx
5Because of space requirements, the coding criteria have not been in-
cluded, but they are available from the authors upon request.
and experience in website analysis. Therefore, inter-coder
reliability is not a problem in this research. During the data
collection, the authors met several times with the coder to
resolve possible doubts.
Most items were rated ‘1’ if they appeared on the website
and ‘0’ if not. Four items were scored ‘0.5’ if they partially
fulfilled the coding criteria (all of them in the corporate gov-
ernance dimension, items c5, c7, c9 and c10, see Table 1).
This method has been applied in similar assessments (Pina
et al., 2010; Royo, Yetano, & Acerete, 2014). Additionally,
some items were given no score at all (i.e. treated as a miss-
ing data) when they referred to non-applicable information
(e.g., consolidated financial statements for those companies
not required to prepare consolidated annual accounts). In
this way, companies were not penalized for not disclosing
non-applicable information.
Dimensions analyzed
To identify how accountability requirements are fulfilled,
the information disclosed in the SOEs’ websites was classified
on 4 dimensions: 1) financial and economic information, 2)
information about objectives, policies and strategies, 3) cor-
porate governance, and 4) usability (see Table 1).
Financial and economic information (“financial”, 17
items) assesses the level of disclosure of annual accounts,
audit reports, budgetary information and public procurement
information, among others. The disclosure of financial in-
formation is a key mechanism in the search for transparency
and accountability as it ensures that stakeholders can form a
reasoned judgement about the financial position, the alloca-
tion and use of public funds and public sector management.
Several authors consider financial reports as key tools tomeet
public financial accountability requirements and highlight
the need to open financial data to the public. Information
about the financial position, financial performance and ser-
vice performance is crucial to determine the sustainability of
service delivery and value for money issues (Chan, 2003; Ko-
pits & Kraig, 1998; Mack & Ryan, 2006; Peters, 2007; Pina et
al., 2010; Torres, Pina, & Acerete, 2006). The items in this di-
mension are information that SOEs are required to prepare
by law. Therefore, the disclosure of the items included in
this dimension should not represent, a priori, any problem
for Spanish SOEs.
Information about objectives, policies and strategies
(“policies”, 13 items) assesses the level of disclosure of non-
financial information referring to the SOEs’ objectives, organ-
izational structure, and CSR report, as well as policies re-
garding internal audit, ethical behavior, remuneration, risk-
management and selection of members of the governing
body, among others. SOEs disclosure should cover both finan-
cial and non-financial information, reflecting the needs of the
multiple stakeholders of these organizations that pursue a so-
cial mission through the use of market mechanisms (Alexius
& Cisneros, 2015; Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014; OECD,
2015b; World Bank, 2014). Therefore, information about
objectives, policies and strategies and sustainability reports
seem particularly helpful for SOE to discharge accountabil-
ity.
Corporate governance (“corporate”, 16 items) includes
disclosures about the exercise of power in an entity, that is,
how it is directed and controlled (Gandia & Archidona, 2008;
Grossi et al., 2015; Hodges, Wright, & Keasey, 1996). These
include the ownership structure, information about directors
and top managers, number of meetings of the BoD, number
of committees within the BoD and the publication of a corpor-
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Individual items
	 26	
Table 1: Individual items  
Item (*) Financial and economic information n % N Item (*) Corporate Governance n % N 
f1 2 Operating budget 11 12.1% 91 c1 2 Corporate governance annual report 12 13.2% 91 
f2 2 Capital budget 10 11.0% 91 c2 2 SOE's ownership structure  56 61.5% 91 
f3 1 Balance sheet 51 56.0% 91 c3 2 Regulation on the operation of the BoD 16 19.8% 81 
f4 1 Income statement 51 56.0% 91 c4 1 List of members of the governing body 54 59.3% 91 
f5 1 Statement of cash flows 38 64.4% 59 c5 1 CVs [Only president: 21; All members: 10]  22.5% 91 
f6 1 Statement of changes in equity 48 52.7% 91 c6 1 Total remuneration of the members of the governing body 7 7.7% 91 
f7 1 Notes 48 52.7% 91 c7 1 Individual remunerations [Only president: 24; All members:1]  16.0% 81 
f8 2 Management report 46 66.7% 69 c8 1 Top management composition (list of members) 61 67.0% 91 
f9 1 Audit report 49 59.0% 83 c9 1 CVs [Only CEO: 9; All managers: 33]  41.2% 91 
f10 2 Financial statements signed by directors 39 76.5% 51 c10 1 Individual remunerations [Only CEO: 26; All managers: 5]  19.8% 91 
f11 1 Consolidated financial statements 6 60.0% 10 c11 2 Status of the directors (executive/non-executive/independent) 14 17.3% 81 
f12 2 Consolidated management report 6 60.0% 10 c12 2 Meetings of the BoD 0 0.0% 81 
f13 1 Consolidated audit report 6 60.0% 10 c13 2 Committees within the BoD 19 23.4% 81 
f14 2 Consolidated financial statements signed by directors 2 33.3% 6 c14 3 Audit/internal control committee 26 32.1% 81 
f15 1 Public procurement 64 70.3% 91 c15 3 Risk committee 4 4.9% 81 
f16 2 Average period of payment to suppliers 2 2.2% 91 c16 3 Nominations and remuneration committee 2 2.5% 81 
f17 1 Performance / quality indicators 32 35.2% 91       
Item (*) Objectives, policies and strategies n % N Item (*) Usability  % N 
p1 2 Articles of association 28 30.8% 91 u1 2 Link to the Transparency/CG section in the homepage 73 80.2% 91 
p2 1 Organization chart 60 65.9% 91 u2 2 Website map 46 50.5% 91 
p3 3 Internal audit department / internal audit procedures 12 13.2% 91 u3 2 Internal search engine 51 56.0% 91 
p4 2 SOE's objectives (mission, vision, values) 29 31.9% 91 u4 2 No broken links 75 82.4% 91 
p5 3 Annual objectives with defined indicators 2 2.2% 91 u5 2 E-mail alerts / RSS 15 16.5% 91 
p6 3 Code of conduct/ethical code/good governance code 37 40.7% 91 u6 1 Ease of management of the reports (searchable pdf) 17 27.4% 62 
p7 3 Fraud prevention policy / Compliance policy 35 38.5% 91 u7 2 Information with hyperlinks 9 14.5% 62 
p8 3 Remuneration policy 1 1.1% 91 u8 2 Financial information available for at least two years 41 45.1% 91 
p9 3 Risk-management policy 16 17.6% 91 u9 2 FAQ section (for financial information / transparency section) 7 7.7% 91 
p10 3 Selection policy for members of the governing body 1 1.1% 91 u10 1 E-mail/online form (transparency/CG information) 46 50.5% 91 
p11 2 CSR policy/code 38 41.8% 91 u11 1 Phone number/postal address (transparency/CG information) 70 76.9% 91 
p12 2 CSR annual report 18 19.8% 91 u12 2 Links to information in other websites 52 57.1% 91 
p13 3 Mechanisms to report on illegal/unethical conduct 33 36.3% 91 u13 2 Multimedia to support disclosure 3 3.3% 91 
      u14 2 Links to social media channels 35 38.5% 91 
(*) Note: 1 = Items whose disclosure is legally required by the Transparency Act (pragmatic legitimacy); 2 = Disclosure of additional 
information or good practices in e-disclosure (moral legitimacy); 3 = Disclosure of information about highly valued internal characteristics or 
procedures (cognitive legitimacy). 
 
(*) Note: 1 = Items whose disclosure is legally required by the Transparency Act (pragmatic legitimacy); 2 = Disclosure of additional information or good practices in e-disclosure
(moral legitimacy); 3 = Disclosure of information about highly valued internal characteristics or procedures (cognitive legitimacy).
ate governance annual report. International initiatives have
highlighted the need for corporate accountability to stake-
holders by making stakeholder concerns one of the primary
principles of corporate governance best practice (Brennan &
Solomon, 2008). Good corporate governance is deemed to
provide control while promoting corporate performance so
that public value is enhanced and public money is not expro-
priated or wasted. Thus, SOEs’ accountability should also
focus on corporate governance elements.
Finally, the usability dimension (“usability”, 14 items) as-
sesses the level of stakeholder orientation in e-disclosure
practices and covers items addressing the following aspects
(Caba et al., 2008; Gandia & Archidona, 2008; Pina et al.,
2010): accessibility to the information, comparability, ease
of management of the information, FAQs, and the possibil-
ity of establishing a dialog between the SOE and interested
stakeholders (interactivity).
Transparency scores and statistical techniques
Five scores were obtained for each SOE, one per dimension
plus a total score, using an equal weighting method. Other
methods would require exercising judgement or consultation
with key stakeholders to determine the weights to use (da
Cruz, Tavares, Marques, Jorge, & de Sousa, 2016). Three
additional scores were calculated by classifying the 60 items
into three blocks depending on the different legitimacy status
defined by Suchman (1995) (see Table 1). “Pragmatic legit-
imacy” is the percentage of disclosure of items whose disclos-
ure is legally required by the Transparency Act (21 items).
“Moral legitimacy” is the percentage of disclosure of addi-
tional information or items that refer to good practices in
e-disclosure (28 items). Lastly, “Cognitive legitimacy” is the
percentage of disclosure of information about highly valued
internal characteristics or procedures (11 items).
To analyze the data obtained through the website con-
tent analysis, we first carried out an exploratory analysis to
provide a general perspective of the use Spanish SOEs make
of their official corporate website for accountability purposes.
Then, in order to identify different accountability patterns
among SOEs, cluster, multidimensional scaling (MDS) and
Pro-Fit analyses have been carried out6. 42 of the 60 items
were used to carry out these analyses. Items with miss-
ing data due to non-applicable information were discarded.
Cluster analysis (Ward method) was used to group the SOEs
into a small number of homogeneous clusters or groups. The
main output of cluster analysis is a dendrogram, which is
difficult to interpret when, as in our study, many cases are in-
cluded (91 SOEs). Therefore, we have complemented the
results of cluster analysis with MDS7. The main output of
MDS is a graphical representation of the data in two dimen-
sions based on how they use their corporate websites for ac-
countability purposes. Figure 2 combines the results of these
two techniques: the map of SOEs obtained through MDS and
the groups derived from cluster analysis. Pro-Fit analysis,
or property fitting8, helps to interpret the dimensions of the
MDS map. It is based on regression analysis and its main out-
6For further details about these techniques, see Serrano, Mar, and Bossi
(2003).
7MDSmaps reduce an ‘n’-dimensional space to just two dimensions. The
objective of MDS is to describe, geometrically, the relationships existing
among different subjects/objects (SOEs) by providing a map that depicts
the position of subjects/objects according to the distances or proximities
between them. Therefore, SOEs are organized in a map in such a way that
the distance between them is an indicator of the degree of relationship.
8Pro-Fit analysis is a technique closely related to multivariate regression
analysis since it attempts to relate the position of the objects (SOEs) in the
MDS configuration to the values of the variables used for the analysis (42
items, in our case). If a variable is related to the position of the objects in the
MDS configuration, there is a function which relates the value of the variable
to the position of the SOEs on the MDS map (Serrano et al., 2003). Follow-
ing this reasoning, 42 ordinary least squares regressions were performed in
order to interpret the MDS map.
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put is a graph that shows the relationships among the vari-
ables used for the analysis and the dimensions of the MDS
map. Together with Pro-Fit analysis, the average scores of
the transparency indexes defined above have been obtained
for each group to help identify different accountability pat-
terns among Spanish SOEs.
Results
Descriptive analysis
Table 1 shows the average percentages of disclosure of
each of the 60 items analyzed. Overall, disclosure levels are
not very high. The highest score corresponds to item u4 (no
broken links, 82.4%) and only 4 additional items have scores
above 70% (f10, f15, u1 and u11). One third of the items
analyzed present intermediate average scores ranging from
50% to 70%. More than 60% of the items analyzed present
average scores below 50%.
In financial and economic information, the items with the
highest percentage of disclosure are public procurement in-
formation (70.3%) and financial statements signed by dir-
ectors (76.5%). We have to note that the number of cases
included to calculate the percentage of disclosure for this
item is 51 (the number of SOEs disclosing their individual
financial statements on their websites). That is, 76.5% of the
SOEs disclosing their financial statements on their websites
provided financial statements signed by their directors, but
they only represent 42.9% of the total sample. The percent-
ages of disclosure of financial statements were 56% for the
balance sheet and income statement and 52.7% for the notes.
59% of the SOEs subject to audit publish their audit reports.
However, only 35.2% of the SOEs publish some kind of per-
formance or quality indicators. Therefore, a first finding is
that not all SOEs upload the economic and financial informa-
tion they are obliged to publish under the Transparency Act.
It can also be appreciated that the disclosure of budgetary
information (operating budget –forecast income statement–
and capital budget –forecast statement of cash flows–) is very
rare, with percentages of disclosure around 10%. The item
in this dimension with the lowest percentage of disclosure is
the average period of payment to suppliers (2.2%).
The percentages of disclosure in objectives, policies and
strategies are much lower. Only one item in this dimension
scores above 50% (organization chart, 65.9%, the only item
in this dimension that SOEs are explicitly required to pub-
lish). Around 40% of the companies analyzed disclose some
kind of code of conduct or good governance or a fraud pre-
vention or compliance policy, but the scores for the rest of
the items are extremely low. Only 31.9% of the companies
disclose their objectives and only 19.8% publish a CSR re-
port. The items in this dimension with the lowest levels of
disclosure are annual objectives with defined indicators, re-
muneration policy and selection policy for members of the
governing body, which are disclosed by just one or two of the
SOEs analyzed.
The percentages of disclosure in corporate governance in-
formation are also very low. Only three items in this dimen-
sion score above 50%: SOEs ownership structure (61.5%),
list of members of the governing body (59.3%) and top man-
agement composition (67%). Strikingly, a number of items
whose disclosure is compulsory obtain very low scores: CVs
of the members of the governing body and top managers
(22.5% and 41.2%) and remunerations of the members of
the governing body and top managers (with average scores
below 20%). Only 13.2% of the companies publish a corpor-
ate governance annual report. For SOEs with a BoD (N=81),
information about the operation of the board, status of dir-
ectors and committees within the board is very rare. Indeed,
none of the companies informed about the number of meet-
ings of the BoD.
As regards usability, as commented above, three out of
the five items with the highest scores in all the sample be-
long to the usability dimension: no broken links (82.4%),
link to the transparency section in the homepage (80.2%)
and phone number or postal address to ask for transparency-
related information (76.9%). However, items that are crit-
ical to enhance the usability of the financial information dis-
closed and stakeholder orientation in e-disclosure practices
have very low scores: e-mail alerts/RSS (16.5%), ease of
management of the information (27.4%), information with
hyperlinks (14.5%), FAQ section (7.7%) and the use of mul-
timedia to support disclosure (3.3%). Furthermore, only
45.1% of the companies publish financial information for at
least two years, hampering comparability. Although most
SOEs place a direct link to the transparency section in their
homepage, the contents published there are rather limited
and only 57.1% of the companies put links to other govern-
ment websites containing financial and economic informa-
tion. Therefore, it seems that the most common e-disclosure
practices are the dissemination of partial information. Fur-
thermore, many companies are not making it easy for in-
terested parties to request information. The Transparency
Act (art. 17) requires public sector organizations to establish
the necessary channels for this type of requests, giving pref-
erence to electronic communications. However, not all the
companies disclose contact details in order to make this type
of request and offline communication seems to be preferred;
76.9% provide a phone number or postal address, whereas
only 50.5% provide an e-mail or online form.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the different
transparency scores calculated. As can be seen, the average
scores are quite low, being below 50% for all the indexes
calculated. Financial and usability dimensions present the
highest average scores (just above 40%), whereas the disclos-
ure of information about objectives, policies and corporate
governance is much less common (mean scores around 25%).
The total average score is just 34%, showing that e-disclosure
practices in Spanish SOEs have much room for improvement.
As regards the legitimacy status of the items analyzed, results
show that the average percentage of disclosure of the items
required by the Transparency Act (46.4%) is higher than for
the other items. The average percentage of disclosure of ad-
ditional information or items that refer to good practices in
e-disclosure is just 32.6%, whereas the disclosure of inform-
ation about highly valued internal characteristics or proced-
ures is very limited (16.9%). In any case, the figures for the
minimum, maximum and standard deviation show that there
are important differences among the SOEs analyzed. The
maximum scores in all dimensions correspond to AENA9, the
only company analyzed which is listed on a stock market. An-
other 4 SOEs have a total score higher than 60%. As can be
seen in Table 2, the median value for the financial dimension
(61.5%) is significantly higher than the mean value (42.7%).
This means that half of the companies analyzed present fin-
ancial scores higher than 61.5%. However, many companies
analyzed have very low scores in this dimension, driving the
average score down. Specifically, 42 companies obtain a fin-
ancial score below 40% and 18 companies have a financial
9The individual scores of SOEs per dimension have not been included
in the paper because of space requirements, but they are available from the
authors upon request.
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Scores by dimension, type of items and total scores.
	 27	
 
Table 2: Scores by dimension, type of it ms and total scores. 
  Mean Median Min Max Stand. Dev. 
FINANCIAL 42.7% 61.5% 0.0% 92.3% 0.3259 
POLICIES 26.2% 23.1% 0.0% 84.6% 0.2167 
CORPORATE 25.6% 25.0% 0.0% 87.5% 0.1823 
USABILITY 44.0% 42.9% 0.0% 85.7% 0.2019 
Pragmatic legitimacy 46.4% 52.6% 0.0% 95.2% 0.2713 
Moral legitimacy 32.6% 32.0% 0.0% 71.4% 0.1617 
Cognitive legitimacy 16.9% 9.1% 0.0% 81.8% 0.1791 
TOTAL 34.1% 36.4% 0.0% 81.7% 0.1845 
 
  
score of 0%. We also want to note that, except for AENA,
scores in “Corporate” and “Cognitive legitimacy” dimensions
are rather low in all the companies. The maximum score
in corporate information (87.5%) is followed by a score of
59.4%. Only 9 SOEs, including AENA, have scores of at least
50% in this dimension. For information about highly valued
internal characteristics or procedures (Cognitive legitimacy),
the maximum score (81.8%) is followed by a score of 54.5%,
and only 3 companies have scores higher than 50% in this
dimension.
Multidimensional scaling and cluster analysis
Figure 2 shows the distribution map of SOEs, applying the
MDS10 technique to the 42 items of information applicable
to all the companies (i.e., N=91 in Table 1). The four groups
have been drawn up according to their statistical proximity,
as measured through cluster analysis.
The two dimensions of Figure 2 have been interpreted
based on Pro-Fit analysis. As can be seen in Figure 3, all
the Pro-Fit vectors point towards the positive side of dimen-
sion 1. Therefore, dimension 1 summarizes all the items
analyzed and is related to higher quality e-disclosure prac-
tices. The ordering of SOEs from right to left is related to
higher total scores per company (the Pearson correlation coef-
ficient between the value of dimension 1 and the total score
is 0.98). Dimension 2 is made up of two groups of variables:
those pointing to the upper half of dimension 2 and those
pointing to the lower half of dimension 2. The variables
associated with dimension 2 in the upper half are mainly
related to the disclosure of financial information: balance
sheet (f3), income statement (f4), statement of changes in
equity (f6), notes (f7), financial information available for
several years (u8) and capital budget (f2). In the lower
half, dimension 2 is mainly associated with the following
variables: performance/quality indicators (f17), code of con-
duct (p6), CSR policy/code (p11), mechanisms to report il-
legal/unethical conduct (p13), corporate governance annual
report (c1), list of members of the governing body (c4), top
management composition (c8), website map (u2), internal
search engine (u3) and phone number or postal address to
ask for transparency-related information (u11). Therefore,
SOEs located in the upper half of dimension 2 show a higher
weight for financial information, whereas those located in the
lower half show a higher weight for policy and corporate in-
formation together with features that increase usability and
stakeholder orientation. This reveals two conflicting account-
ability approaches in the SOEs analyzed: those that take a
narrow approach to accountability, focusing on financial in-
10In the MDS analysis, the value of Kruskal stress in six dimensions was
0.115, which could be described as “fair” (Kruskal, 1964). To visualize the
map, it is necessary to work with projections of the map onto pairs of di-
mensions. Figure 2 shows the projection of the map onto dimension 1 and
dimension 2.
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Table 3: Average sc res in the four groups of SOEs identified. 
 Group 
Total  1 2 3 4 
FINANCIAL 57.2% 71.0% 8.1% 3.3% 42.7% 
POLICIES 52.1% 21.6% 18.0% 2.4% 26.2% 
CORPORATE 41.2% 26.2% 22.4% 2.7% 25.6% 
USABILITY 60.2% 45.7% 40.5% 18.5% 44.0% 
Pragmatic legitimacy 66.9% 62.1% 27.6% 3.7% 46.4% 
Moral legitimacy 46.7% 37.0% 23.4% 11.8% 32.6% 
Cognitive legitimacy 39.5% 11.1% 9.1% 0.0% 16.9% 
TOTAL 52.2% 40.3% 22.0% 6.6% 34.1% 
 
 
formation (agency theory point of view) and those that un-
derstand accountability in a broader way. It should be noted
that the financial information associated with the upper half
of dimension 2 is available from other sources (Transparency
portal), whereas this is not the case for performance indicat-
ors and the information in the policies and corporate dimen-
sions. Therefore, companies focusing on the disclosure of
the items associated with the upper half of dimension 2 are
not providing any added value, except for the convenience of
making this information available on the corporate website.
In any case, overall, we cannot conclude that companies loc-
ated in the lower half of Figure 2 perform better than those
located in the upper half. For this type of overall comparis-
ons in e-disclosure practices, the position in dimension 1 has
to be considered.
Group 1 includes 26 SOEs. Most of them are big compan-
ies that prepare individual annual accounts in the standard
format and consolidated financial statements. Indeed, 7 of
the 10 parent companies in the sample are included in this
group. However, 3 small companies using the abbreviated
format to elaborate their individual annual accounts are also
included in this group. All the companies in this group have a
BoD. This group is on the right-hand side of dimension 1 and
has the highest scores in all the dimensions studied except
for the “financial score” (see Table 3). Its mean total score
is 52.2%. Most of the SOEs in this group are in the lower
half of dimension 2, showing that these companies are those
giving more importance to policy and corporate information
together with features that increase usability and stakeholder
orientation.
Group 2 includes 31 SOEs. As in Group 1, most of them
are big companies that prepare individual annual accounts in
the standard format and all of them have a BoD. Two parent
companies preparing consolidated financial statements are
included, but the number of small companies using the ab-
breviated format to elaborate their annual accounts is higher
(9 SOEs, representing almost 30% of the companies included
in this group). Most of the SOEs in this group are also on
the right-hand side of dimension 1, but most of them are in
the upper half of dimension 2. Its mean total score is 40.3%,
showing a lower degree of e-disclosure. Its position in the up-
per half of dimension 2 evidences a greater emphasis on the
disclosure of financial information. Indeed, Group 2 obtains
the highest average score in this dimension (71%). All SOEs
in this group disclose their balance sheet, income statement,
audit report, and financial statements signed by directors.
Group 3 includes 18 SOEs. Half of them present abbrevi-
ated annual accounts and only one parent company required
to prepare consolidated annual accounts is included. Four of
the companies in this group do not have a BoD. This group
is on the left of dimension 1, which shows poor e-disclosure
practices (with an average total score of 22%). As can be
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MDS configuration
Figure 2: MDS configuration. 
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seen in Table 3, they have much lower scores than Group 2
in financial information (8.1%, with all the financial items in
this group but public procurement and performance/quality
indicators having an average score of 0%), whereas the av-
erage scores in policies, corporate and usability are closer to
the previous group.
Group 4, which includes 16 SOEs and is on the extreme left
of dimension 1, is made up of enterprises that make hardly
any use of their corporate website for the dissemination of
financial, corporate or policy-related information. As can be
seen in Table 3, their very low total scores come from the
usability dimension. Most of the companies in this group
(11 companies) are small companies preparing their annual
accounts using the abbreviated format and none of the SOEs
included is required to prepare consolidated annual accounts.
Most of the companies in the sample which do not have a BoD
(6 out of 10) are included in this group.
Discussion
The Spanish context reveals some attempts at the legal
level to improve downward accountability. However, SOEs’
e-disclosure practices are still in their infancy. Results show
that downward transparency is not a priority for most Span-
ish SOEs. Financial and economic information and the
items related to usability obtain the highest levels of dis-
closure, with average scores of around 40-45%. The results
on the disclosure of information about objectives, policies
and strategies, or related to corporate governance issues are
worse, with average scores of around 25%. As shown by
previous studies at the local level (Pina et al., 2010; Pina et
al., 2009), only information already available and easily ob-
tained, such as most of the items in the financial dimension,
is disclosed, and even this dimension shows, on average, low
levels of disclosure.
Stakeholder orientation does not seem to be a concern
for Spanish SOEs: financial accountability is their main fo-
cus and most are silent about their policies, objectives and
corporate governance structures. These findings are consist-
ent with previous research (Alexius & Cisneros, 2015; Daiser
et al., 2017; Greiling et al., 2015), highlighting the prior-
itization of financial values and an economic logic despite
formal aspirations to balance the values at stake (including
non-financial values, such as sustainability, environmental
and social values). This contrasts with the traditional type
of legal system in Spain (code law) which, according to Ball
et al. (2000), characterizes Spain as having a “stakeholder
governance model”. However, our results suggest that most
Spanish SOEs follow a shareholder governance model.
Agency and stakeholder theories confirm the need for le-
gislation and enforcement (urgency) to fulfill downward ac-
countability. Spanish SOEs have not yet adopted a proact-
ive approach to transparency by supplying corporate informa-
tion to citizens through their websites. Legitimacy and stake-
holder theories argue that motivation for voluntary disclos-
ure takes place when there is higher visibility, urgency and
pressure from stakeholders. Other public sector entities, such
as big local governments, probably feel more pressure to be
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accountable to the public as a whole, particularly because
they have been under close scrutiny from think tanks, aca-
demia and non-government organizations. For example, big
local governments have been subject to periodic transparency
assessments by Transparency International-Spain (Araujo &
Tejedo-Romero, 2018). This type of assessments had not
been carried out for Spanish SOEs when data collection for
this study took place11. Elections may also be a major source
of accountability pressures. As anticipated by legitimacy the-
ory, larger SOEs have, in general terms, higher levels of e-
disclosure, very probably due to their higher visibility. In fact,
AENA (airports), the only listed company in the sample, and
other companies with high levels of visibility such as RENFE
(trains), CORREOS (post), EFE (news services) and SELAE
(lottery) are included in the group with the highest levels of
disclosure. However, in the context under study, urgency and
pressure from stakeholders do not seem to be perceived by
the majority of the SOEs.
The analysis of the items depending on their legitimacy
status (legal requirements, best practices or professionaliz-
ation) shows that the highest levels of disclosure are for
11Transparency International Spain (2018) has recently released its first
transparency assessment for the 45 biggest SOEs in Spain, also obtaining
very low results (45.3%, on average), even though the SOEs were informed
about the preliminary scores obtained (initial average of 28.6%) and given
the possibility to update their websites or indicate where in the website the
information was published. As can be appreciated, this two-step procedure
resulted in a remarkable improvement in the transparency scores, but much
room for improvement still exists.
items legally required by the Transparency Act, with aver-
age scores of 46.4%. The average score for items related
to best practices and professionalization are lower, 32.6%
and 16.9%, respectively. In any case, the low average scores
even for legally required items evidences that enforcement
of transparency-related legislation is an issue in the Span-
ish context. The government is not controlling downward
accountability to the same extent as upward accountability,
which is why Spanish SOEs consider downward transparency
as of low urgency. The budgetary information of these entit-
ies is part of the State budget. This information is elaborated
and communicated to the corresponding Ministry (who must
approve it), but hardly any SOEs provide it through their web-
sites. This contrasts with other public institutions that dis-
close budgetary information to a greater extent than financial
information, indicating that accountability in hybrid organiz-
ations is perceived differently than in fully public entities. In
this sense, SOEs seem to have a corporate accountability ap-
proach closer to the private than to the public sector.
Spanish SOEs do not perceive citizens as key stakeholders
or, at least, do not consider the need to provide greater dis-
closure to the community with the same urgency as interna-
tional organizations, such as the OECD and the World Bank.
This is consistent with the traditional public administration
style in Continental and Southern European countries, which
has a greater focus on upward than on downward account-
ability (Bastida & Benito, 2007; Pina et al., 2010). The stake-
holder orientation of Spanish SOEs follows the common pat-
tern in Southern European countries in which the citizen is
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considered to be a recipient of services rather than an active
participant. Thus, most SOEs are still anchored in a narrow
accountability style that only considers shareholders as the
key stakeholders. As regards citizens and downward trans-
parency, minimally complying with legal requirements, at
best, is considered to be enough. Therefore, there is a hybrid
accountability pattern in Spanish SOEs, with a corporate ac-
countability approach closer to the private than to the public
sector, but also showing some of the distinctive features of
the traditional public sector administrative culture in South-
ern European countries.
The Spanish SOE sector is characterized by weak compli-
ance procedures, with low levels of disclosure even in leg-
ally required information. Previous research analyzing local
governments has highlighted that non-conformance to trans-
parency regulations is an important issue in the Spanish pub-
lic sector (Martí, Royo, & Acerete, 2012). The low scores
in the cognitive legitimacy (professionalization) index also
show that, in general, Spanish SOEs have weak internal con-
trols and processes. Recent corruption scandals in Spanish
SOEs and the increased attention to public sector transpar-
ency and accountability should have resulted in more dis-
closure because organizations are expected to associate ad-
ditional disclosures with “more accountability”, in line with
the socially constructed system of norms, values and beliefs.
However, our results indicate that this has not been the case
in the context analyzed. As said before, transparency-related
pressures are perceived to a greater extent in other layers of
government.
Three different patterns of accountability can be defined
for Spanish SOEs corresponding to the behavior of the 4
groups obtained with cluster analysis. Group 1, the good,
includes the SOEs with a more balanced approach to trans-
parency, with medium-high scores in all the indexes and us-
ing their corporate websites as an integrated platform to
improve information dissemination and satisfy stakeholder
needs. However, even in this group, there is room for im-
provement. One entity stands out from the rest: AENA, the
pretty one in terms of e-disclosure. It is the only listed SOE
and, thus, is subject to both public accountability and “real”
shareholder accountability. Its high level of e-disclosure is
most probably due to greater enforcement of disclosure re-
quirements as a listed company because it is subject to the
monitoring of an independent watchdog, the CNMV sheriff.
Groups 3 and 4, the bad, hardly disclose any type of informa-
tion. SOEs in Group 2 are the ugly. They are strongly focused
on the disclosure of mandatory information, particularly the
financial information legally required by the Transparency
Act. However, they fail to present policy and corporate in-
formation.
Results indicate that, in general terms, size and visibil-
ity are related to higher levels of e-disclosure, but some ex-
ceptions suggest that managerial will is an important driver.
Overall, our findings suggest that accountability, like legitim-
ation, is not homogeneous, and that the different facets of
accountability are somewhat conflictive. Spanish SOEs are
a long way from fulfilling the OECD (2005b, 2015b) recom-
mendation that they should be as transparent as listed com-
panies. Furthermore, results also highlight the existence of
a weak institutional environment in Spain as regards public
sector transparency and e-disclosure. As Suchman (1995) in-
dicates, in these settings, organizations very often adhere to
the most superficial forms of legitimation (pragmatic legitim-
acy), minimally complying to legal requirements. However,
as this author indicates, there are “typical” legitimation pro-
gressions.
As in all web content analyses, this study is just a snap-
shot of SOEs’ e-disclosure practices at a specific moment in
time. As the Internet is evolving continuously, the results
of this study will not be valid forever, and future research
should update the findings obtained here. This paper has
only analyzed the presence of certain items/information on
the official websites, but not the quality of the information
disclosed. Further longitudinal studies would be useful to
assess whether SOEs accountability practices are evolving to-
wards the adoption of best practices in e-disclosure and con-
formance to established models and standards, as the typ-
ical legitimation progressions proposed by Suchman (1995)
suggest. Future research should also analyze the drivers of
higher levels of e-disclosure in greater depth by proposing
and testing a theoretical model to explain the differences in
SOEs’ e-disclosure levels. Future studies in other countries
and public administration styles would also be useful to test
whether the accountability styles found for Spanish SOEs can
be extrapolated to other settings.
Conclusions
This paper aims to identify the e-disclosure patterns that
SOEs follow to render accountability to citizens. Overall,
Spanish SOEs do not consider corporate websites as a key me-
dium to communicate with their stakeholders and do not feel
any real urgency to comply with transparency-related legal
requirements or legitimate pressures from their stakeholders
to keep them informed. Financial accountability is the main
focus and most SOEs are silent about their policies, object-
ives and corporate governance structures. The majority of
them are still anchored in a narrow accountability style that
only considers shareholders as the key stakeholders and are a
long way from fulfilling the OECD recommendation that they
should be as transparent as listed companies. Based on their
e-disclosure behaviors, three different patterns of accountab-
ility have been found in Spanish SOEs: the good (balanced
approach to transparency, using their corporate websites as
an integrated platform to improve information dissemination
and satisfy stakeholder needs), the bad (they hardly disclose
any type of information) and the ugly (strongly focused on
the disclosure of mandatory information, particularly the fin-
ancial information legally required by the Transparency Act).
AENA stands out among the good as the pretty.
Spanish SOEs still have to make important efforts to pro-
mote downward accountability to citizens. The practical
implications of this research are that SOEs’ managers have
to increase downward accountability and that profession-
als involved in the external overseeing of SOEs must strive
to enforce transparency requirements. As enforcement of
transparency-related legislation is scarce in Spain, measures
should be adopted to improve compliance and foster a truly
proactive approach in promoting downward accountability
to citizens. Based on our findings, the following recommend-
ations to improve e-disclosure practices among SOEs are sug-
gested. First, the enforcement and adoption of additional
e-disclosure requirements, under the supervision of a sher-
iff, an independent monitoring body, is needed. This has
proven to be effective for listed companies and other pub-
lic sector entities. In the UK, for example, the Foundations
Trusts of the English National Health Service are under the su-
pervision of an independent watchdog, Monitor, with its own
Code of Governance, which enhances public accountability
(see e.g. Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle, 2016). Other meas-
ures include: the publication of guidance manuals; training
seminars; the adoption of mechanisms to periodically meas-
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ure, assess and report the implementation of disclosure re-
quirements by SOEs; and performance awards to individual
SOEs for high quality disclosure practices (OECD, 2015b). In-
ternational comparisons may shed light on which measures
are more effective to promote downward accountability to
citizens.
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